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In healthcare, patient safety has received substantial attention and, in turn, a number of 
approaches to managing safety have been adopted from other high-risk industries. One of 
these has been risk assessment, predominantly through the use of risk matrices. However, 
whilst other industries have criticised the design and use of these risk matrices, the 
applicability of such criticism has not been investigated formally in healthcare. This study 
examines risk matrices, as used in acute hospitals in England, and the guidance provided for 
their use. It investigates the applicability of criticisms of risk matrices from outside healthcare 
through a document analysis of the risk assessment policies, procedures and strategies used in 
English hospitals. The findings reveal that there is a large variety of risk matrices used, where 
the design of some might increase the chance of risk misprioritisation. Additionally, findings 
show that hospitals may provide insufficient guidance on how to use risk matrices as well as 
what to do in response to the existing criticisms of risk matrices. Consequently, this is likely 
to lead to variation in the quality of risk assessment and in the subsequent deployment of 
resources to manage the assessed risk. Finally, the paper outlines ways in which hospitals 
could use risk matrices more effectively. 







The healthcare industry has paid substantial attention to the improvement of patient safety.(1) 
To this end, a number of leading reports have been published(2,3) and a range of approaches 
have been adopted from other high risk industries.(4,5) Risk assessment is one such approach, 
where the aim is to prevent harm before it occurs by addressing three questions: “What could 
go wrong?”, “How bad and how often?”, and “Is there any need for action, and if so, 
what?”.(6,7) However, organisation-wide risk assessment in healthcare is predominantly 
conducted by the use of risk matrices, and risk matrices have inherent challenges that limit 
the effectiveness of the risk assessment.(7–10)  
A risk matrix is a tool to visualise and prioritise risks and to guide resource allocations.(9,11,12) 
It consists of likelihood (or probability or frequency) and consequence (or severity or impact) 
axes to estimate a risk rating. Risk prioritisation and resource allocations are determined 
depending on where the risk rating falls on the risk matrix.(9,13,14) Figure 1 shows a generic 
example of a 5 x 5 risk matrix, where both axes are categorised by using nominal descriptors 
(e.g. rare and negligible) and the risk matrix is divided into 3 bands. A lower band, which 
may often be coloured green, represents low risks, which are tolerable and, therefore, no risk 
treatment measures are needed. A middle band, which may be coloured orange, represents 
moderate risks to be reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). An upper 
band, which may be coloured red, represents high risks, which are typically intolerable and, 
therefore, risk treatment is essential.(14,15) Depending on which coloured band the risk rating 
is assigned to, the assessor decides whether or not to treat the risk and what actions are 
needed.(9) 
 
Fig. 1. A 5 x 5 risk matrix 
In England, each hospital defines its own risk matrix to be used in risk assessment, which 
includes the assessment of clinical, organisational, health and safety and financial risks.(12) 
Risk matrices are embedded into the organisational risk register system that each hospital 
member can access the system and register a risk. A risk matrix can help to visualise and 
prioritise a range of risks that are reported by different individuals (e.g. clinicians, nurses, 
managers) across different units.(16) The simplicity of a risk matrix and its convenience in 
representing risks make it a frequently used tool.(17,18) However, anecdotal evidence shows 
that practical risk management in hospitals might misuse or overuse the risk matrices by 
using the matrices as an assessment, measurement and control tool rather than a simple 
visualisation tool. However, there have also been criticisms in the safety research literature 
regarding the effectiveness of risk matrices even with its feature of being a visualisation 
tool.(9,10,13,18–22) Some researchers have focused on technical problems,(13,21) while some have 
focused on the subjectivity of the risk ratings.(18) In addition, the traditional risk description 
that the risk matrices were built on it was found to be insufficient.(23,24) Cox has even warned 
that risk matrices may be “worse than useless”.(9) These authors suggest that there are 
challenges to using risk matrices that should be overcome in order to achieve more reliable 
results. Yet, there is little research that demonstrates how risk assessment practice in 
healthcare has been taking these criticisms into account. One study, which does aim to assess 
this, is Card et al (2013), which evaluated risk assessment and risk control guidance provided 
in 25 Trusts in East of England. They found that there is insufficient guidance provided to 
support risk evaluation and risk control.(10) Here, we build on this work by extending the 
scale of the investigation and the analysis.  
This study examines the risk matrices used in acute hospitals in England and identifies 
potential problems that result in light of existing criticisms. It also makes a number of 
recommendations for improving the risk matrices and their use in hospitals. 
2. METHODS 
Document analysis was conducted by collecting relevant data from acute hospitals in the 
English National Health Service (NHS). Acute hospitals provide consultation with specialist 
clinicians, emergency treatment, surgery and specialist care.(25) To obtain data, a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOI) request was sent to all acute hospitals in the English NHS (160) on 
July 11, 2016, by e-mail. The hospitals were asked to provide their current risk assessment 
procedure and policy (or nearest equivalent documents, e.g. risk management policy, 
strategy, procedure or guidance).  
Collected documents were reviewed to examine the risk matrix used by each hospital. 
Variables for examining risk matrices used in hospitals included the characteristics of risk 
matrices, and guidance on likelihood and consequence ratings. The characteristics of risk 
matrices were defined by identifying the risk matrix size (e.g. a 3x3 or 5x5 matrix), matrix 
type (as being symmetrical or asymmetrical), the number of bands on the risk matrix and the 
risk ratings for each band. The variables of guidance on likelihood and consequence rating 
included whether each consequence domain (e.g. impact on safety or finance) and each 
likelihood scale (e.g. nominal, time-framed, probability-based) were defined, and whether 
further guidance was provided for risk rating. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Response Rate 
There is a legal obligation for hospitals to aim to respond to a FOI request within 20 working 
days of receipt.(26) 100 (out of 160) hospitals responded within 35 working days following the 
FOI request. From the collected responses, 142 documents (4190 pages) were collated. 
3.2. Risk Matrices 
The reviews of the data showed that all hospitals except one estimated their clinical or non-
clinical (e.g. financial, health and safety, and organisational) risk ratings by multiplying 
likelihood and consequence. A single hospital used a different calculation for risk rating (Risk 
rating = Likelihood + Impact + Control measure). Due to the uniqueness of this approach, 
this hospital’s documents were not included in the study.  
All remaining hospitals (99) used a 5x5 risk matrix. Typically, the consequence (C) axis was 
categorised with nominal descriptors (e.g. negligible and minor), and a score from 1 to 5 was 
assigned for each descriptor as follows: negligible=1, minor=2, moderate=3, major=4 and 
catastrophic=5. Likewise, the likelihood (L) axis most often used was: rare=1, unlikely=2, 
possible=3, likely=4 and almost certain=5. Since scores are assigned to both consequence 
and likelihood categories, the risk rating is represented by a risk score. Therefore, the risk 
score is estimated by multiplying the two scores.  
3.2.1. Characteristics of Risk Matrices 
The characteristics of risk matrices include their size, consideration of risk matrix types, the 
number of coloured risk bands, and their meanings. Figure 2 illustrates every type of risk 
matrix identified from the data obtained and by how many hospitals. Each unique risk matrix 
type is identified with a code from M1 to M28, and risk matrices are grouped by determining 



























Between them, the 99 hospitals identified 28 different risk matrices in their policies and 
procedures. Of these, 23 use a risk matrix with 3 coloured bands, 70 use one with 4 coloured 
bands and 6 use one with 5 coloured bands. Coloured bands were defined by the hospitals to 
categorise the risk ratings, to determine the tolerability of a risk, and the level of management 
action needed. For example, a green (very light grey in Figure 2) band (a risk score of 1-3) on 
the risk matrix of M9 represents low risk, a yellow (light grey) band (a risk score of 4-6) 
represents moderate risk, an orange (medium grey) band (a risk score of 8-12) represents 
high risk, and a red (dark grey) band (a risk score of 15-25) represents extreme risks. 
Similarly, a risk matrix with 3 coloured bands categorises risk ratings as low, moderate and 
high; and one with 5 coloured bands categorises risk ratings as very low, low, moderate, high 
and extreme. 
Although coloured bands determine the tolerability of a risk, only 28 hospitals explained the 
link between the coloured bands and the level of tolerability on their documents. Risk 
tolerability refers to the willingness to live with risk, but not necessarily accepting the risk.(27) 
However, only a few of these 28 hospitals set a tolerability level aligned each coloured band. 
For instance, a hospital using the M9 described tolerability levels as: a green band represents 
acceptable risks, a yellow band and an orange band represent tolerable risks, and a red band 
represents intolerable risks. Remaining hospitals either only described acceptable or 
unacceptable risks, such as “below a score of 12 is acceptable”, and “risks being lead to 
death is unacceptable”.  
To determine the level of management action, hospitals provided guidance based on the 
coloured bands. The level of management attention comprises the distribution of 
responsibilities, the level of prioritisation for actions, and the assignment of risk review 
frequency. Table I provides examples of this from 3 randomly selected hospitals. However, it 
should be noted that the specific management actions can vary from hospital to hospital. 
Table I. Examples of the level of management attention for each coloured band 
Coloured bands Management responsibility Action prioritisation Review 
frequency 
3 Coloured bands 
− Green band (Low risk) 
− Orange band (Moderate risk)  
− Red band (High risk) 
 
− Ward/ departmental level  
− Divisional/ directorate level   
− Board level 
 
− No immediate action required 
Action required  
− Immediate action required 
 
Annually        
Quarterly      
Monthly 
4 Coloured bands 
− Green band (Low risk) 
− Yellow band (Moderate risk) 
− Orange band (High risk)  
− Red band (Extreme risk) 
 
− Ward/ departmental level  
− Divisional level  
− Directorate level  
− Board level 
 
 
No immediate action required 
Action required  
− Action required  






5 Coloured bands 
− Dark green band (Very low risk) 
− Green band (Low risk) 
− Yellow band (Moderate risk)  
− Orange band (High risk) 
− Red band (Extreme risk) 
 
 
Ward/ departmental level  
− Ward/ departmental level  
− Divisional level  
− Directorate level  
− Board level 
 
 
No action required 
No immediate action required 
Action required  
− Action required  
− Immediate action required 
 
 





In seven risk matrices, the product of the scores does not establish the coloured bands. These 
are M11, M12, M13 M15, M18, M22 and M28, which we refer to as asymmetrical risk 
matrices. In an asymmetrical risk matrix, the same risk score can be assigned to different risk 
rating categories. As an illustration of this point, a hospital may be faced at all times (giving a 
likelihood score of 5) with a risk of incomplete orders of intraocular lenses. However, they 
are various ways in which this risk could be managed to minimise the consequences (giving a 
consequence score of 1). Alternatively, the risk of contamination during the manual handling 
process of infectious blood samples might be something, which is not expected (giving a 
likelihood score of 1), but it could ultimately lead to death (giving a consequence score of 5). 
While both risks are scored as 5 (L:5 x C:1 and L:1 x C:5), an asymmetrical risk matrix of 
M22 assigns the former as a low risk and the latter as a high risk. 
3.2.2. Consequence and Likelihood Scoring Guidance 
All hospitals provided nominal descriptors for scoring consequence and likelihood (e.g. 
negligible and minor; rare and unlikely). However, although the majority of hospitals 
provided further guidance for scoring consequence and some for likelihood, none provided 
any justification for their recommended guidance. 
85 hospitals (out of 99) offered detailed guidance for scoring consequence, all of which were 
based on a single report, “A risk matrix for risk managers”.(12) These hospitals provided 
explanations for each nominal descriptor by considering each consequence domain (i.e. 
impact on safety, quality, human resources, statutory requirements, reputation, business 
objectives, finance, service interruption and the environment).(12) Table II provides an 
example of such guidance for the consequence domain of ‘impact on safety’.  





Explanation (impact on safety) 
1 Negligible Minimal injury requiring no/minimal intervention or treatment 
2 Minor Minor injury or illness requiring minor intervention  
3 Moderate Moderate injury requiring professional intervention 
4 Major Major injury leading to long term incapacity/disability 
5 Catastrophic Death or multiple permanent injuries or irreversible health effects  
40 hospitals provided a time-framed scale (i.e. L:1=not expected to occur for years, L:2=at 
least annually, L:3=at least monthly, L:4=at least weekly and L:5=at least daily) to score 
likelihood; slightly more (44) hospitals provided probability scales (e.g. L:1= <0.1% and 
L:5= >50%); and 25 hospitals provided both. While all hospitals provided the same time-
framed scale to score likelihood, there were two particularly commonly used probability 
scales out of a total of 12 probability scales. This is likely to mean that even if two hospitals 
have the same risk matrix, the assessors in these two hospitals would score the same risk 
differently due to their different guidance on likelihood scoring. 
Only 16 hospitals provided guidance on scoring a risk where there might be multiple 
potential consequences in the same consequence category. To illustrate this concept, a risk of 
a patient falling on a ward could lead to various degrees of harm: no harm (with a 
consequence rating of 1 and likelihood rating of 4), minor cuts and bruises (with a 
consequence rating of 2 and likelihood rating of 3), hip fracture (with a consequence rating 
of 4 and likelihood rating of 2), or death (with a consequence rating of 5 and likelihood 
rating of 1). Of those who provided guidance, five advised using ‘the worst case scenario’ 
strategy; four advised using ‘the highest risk score’ strategy; one advised using ‘the most 
likely scenario’ strategy; and six advised using ‘reasonably foreseeable worst case scenario’ 
strategy. For example, following the worst case scenario strategy might lead to death, and, 
therefore, to a risk score of 5 (with a consequence rating of 5 and likelihood rating of 1); 
whereas following the most likely scenario strategy would lead to no harm to be determined, 
and, therefore, to a risk score of 4 (with a consequence rating of 1 and likelihood rating of 4).  
4. DISCUSSION 
This paper provides an overview of the risk matrices used in hospitals in England. The 
findings reveal that hospitals, which responded, use a range of risk matrices as well as 
different guidelines for scoring consequence and likelihood of the risks. Although one may 
think that this might be due to a hospital’s risk appetite, as some hospitals might accept or 
tolerate more risks than others, no explanations were found to justify their use of the selected 
risk matrix or guideline. In turn, hospitals might reach different decisions on the management 
of the same risk. However, the main problem identified concerns the adequacy of the 
guidance provided for their use and the limitations inherent to the risk matrices used. This 
section therefore examines in more detail the currently used risk matrices and guidelines in 
the light of the existing criticisms in the literature, and provides a number of 
recommendations for their potential improvement.  
4.1. Analysis of the Existing Guidance on the Use of Risk Matrices 
The review of the risk assessment policies and procedures reveals a lack of clarity in the 
guidance provided in the following areas: the meaning of coloured bands, what to do when a 
risk could result in different consequences, which likelihood scoring scheme to use and in 
what circumstances, the strategy of risk scoring, and the strategy of risk prioritisation for the 
same scored risks. 
It is not clear from the results whether or not coloured bands indeed determine the tolerability 
of a risk (e.g. a green band refers to tolerable risks). In fact, risk scores bear little relation to 
the real risk ratings. Actually, even if quantitative values were used to estimate risk ratings, 
the assessors’ strength of knowledge on the event, its consequences and probability would 
impact on the judgments made to estimate the risk ratings.(24,28,29) In addition, the tolerability 
of a risk might require consideration of multiple other factors in addition to likelihood and 
consequence. Indeed, when evaluating risks, there are additional factors to determine, 
including detectability of a risk, the rapidity with which the risk will manifest itself and 
potentially additional legal requirements.(23,30–32) Thus, it should be acknowledged that the 
solely reliance on the coloured bands when making risk tolerability decisions might mislead 
the assessors. Yet, the level of tolerability can be set by providing less precise instructions, 
such as the green bands refers to ‘generally tolerable’ risks, instead of referring to ‘tolerable’ 
risks despite the fact that this could lead to more inconsistency in the use of the risk matrices 
and might add more subjectivity to the current risk assessment practice in hospitals. 
85 hospitals (out of 99) provided descriptors to score the consequences for different 
consequence domains (e.g. impact on safety and reputation). However, no guidance was 
found detailing what to do when a risk could result in different consequences for different 
consequence domains. For instance, severely delayed cancer treatment might result in 
unavoidable harm to patients as well as patient complaints and reputational damage. Risk 
matrices evaluate risks by considering a single consequence domain. This can be considered 
as a limitation of the use of risk matrices. To address such a problem, we suggest that 
analysts could aggregate or combine risks. Indeed, Card et al have suggested compiling an 
index of total assessed risks in healthcare.(10) This allows risk assessors to consider all 
domains of consequence for a risk and to measure the overall risk by taking the sum of the 
individual risks for each domain. However, no evidence has been found in the literature to 
support the effectiveness of such a method in healthcare.  
There was also a lack of clarity around the guidance provided for scoring likelihood. 
Hospitals provided different types of likelihood scales (i.e. nominal, time-framed and 
probability), and yet none of these provided any further guidance on when to use which type 
of likelihood scoring scale. Intriguingly, there was no reference to time in any of the 
hospitals’ guidance on the use of probabilities. For instance, it was not clear if the probability 
of 50% refers to a day or a year. Apart from the hospitals’ documents, there are exceptions to 
this. For example, the UK’s National Patient Safety Agency has suggested that probability 
and time can be used concurrently, but provides this guidance only in the context of project 
management and the management of business objectives.(12) Similarly, Duijm recommends 
using probability for one-off projects and frequency for continuous operations.(13) This 
indicates that hospitals could predominantly use a time-framed likelihood scale to score 
likelihood of a risk since most of the risks in hospitals are in relation to operations.  
It was also not always clear from the collected dataset how to score a risk when it might 
result in various degrees of severity with different probabilities (as mentioned earlier with the 
patient fall example). 16 hospitals, however, did provide strategies for such circumstances. 
These are ‘the worst case scenario’, ‘the highest risk score’, ‘the most likely scenario’, and 
‘reasonably foreseeable worst case scenario’. However, all strategies might lead to bias at 
some point. For instance, ‘the worst case scenario’ might lead to an over consideration of the 
most extreme cases; ‘the most likely scenario’ might ignore the extreme cases; ‘the 
reasonably foreseeable worst case scenario’ might lead to most of the risk scores being 
assigned to intermediate coloured bands; and ‘the highest risk score scenario’ might require 
the measurement of risk scores for all possibilities, which might be considered to be time 
consuming. Although there is always a possibility of bias in following such strategies, it is 
advised in the literature to consider ‘the worst credible case scenario’ as referring to ‘the 
reasonably foreseeable worst case scenario’.(31,33–35)  
Additionally, there was no evidence found on which of the risks should be given a priority 
when multiple risks received the same score. For instance, many risks might be scored as the 
same and, therefore, assigned to the same risk level (if the risk matrix is symmetrical). 
However, the risk matrix does not help the assessor to decide which one to give priority for 
risk treatment. For example, is it better to prioritise higher likelihood risks of similar scored 
(those that are most likely to see), or higher impact risks (those that may cause most harm)? 
While the quantitative risk rating values might help to decide which one to prioritise, it would 
be less practical for healthcare staff to consider quantitative risk ratings rather than scores. 
Yet, they could consider additional factors. In the safety literature, this has been 
acknowledged that risk-based decisions should be made by considering beyond the findings 
of risk analysis.(24,36,37) This involves both professional and subjective judgement. For 
instance, patient safety is often stated as primary goal in hospitals, and there might be 
multiple other factors to consider when prioritising risks, including organisational objectives, 
detectability, legislation, and the resources needed to implement any risk controls.  
To address such challenges, providing better guidance would help healthcare staff to use risk 
matrices more effectively. However, there are a number of other issues in relation to the 
design and the use of risk matrices that need to be determined to be able to use risk matrices 
better. 
4.2. Analysis of the Currently Used Risk Matrices 
Reviews of the results suggest that risk matrices can be used by hospitals inconsistently due 
to the risk scoring and the selection of risk matrices. 
Hospitals use descriptors for consequence (e.g. negligible, minor, moderate, major and 
catastrophic) and likelihood (rare, unlikely, possible, likely and almost certain) by 
simultaneously assigning scores to these descriptors. However, the product of scores will bear 
little relationship to the underlying risk ratings, which might lead to a compound error. For 
instance, a risk with a score of 25 may not be 25 times as bad as a risk with a score of 1 from 
the real world descriptions of these scores. Figure 3 demonstrates the significance of the 
quantitative risk rating between the lower right and upper left corner as being £0 to over 
£500,000, instead of 1 to 25. Thus, the use of risk scores might mislead assessors in 
determining the significance of a risk, especially when comparing one risk to another.  
While the above discussion concerns the replacement of risk ratings by risk scores, there are 
also limitations inherent to the use of risk ratings. Cox claims that the qualitative risk rating 
categorisation (e.g. low, moderate and high) is a simplification to make risk related decisions; 
quantitatively different risk ratings can be assigned to identical risk ratings category; and 
quantitatively lower risk ratings can be assigned to a higher qualitative risk rating 
category.(9,38) Such limitations are demonstrated in Figure 3 by the use of the M9 risk matrix 
and guidance provided by a hospital. Since hospitals use scores in line with the descriptions 
of consequence and likelihood categories, risk scores are also assigned to the risk matrix in 
Figure 3.  
	
Fig.	3.	Quantitative	risk	matrix	for	M9 
Figure 3 shows that a quantitative risk rating of £10,000 per annual can be assigned to both 
the high risk and extreme risk rating categories. Similarly, a risk score of 8 is estimated to 
represent a cost of between £1,000 (L:4 x C:2) and £5,000 or between £100 and £10,000 (L:2 
x C:4).  
The results of this study also show that 9 hospitals use asymmetrical risk matrices, where a 
risk score can be assigned to different risk rating categories by the same risk matrix. Such 
matrices do not just use the product of risk scores to establish coloured bands. While 
technically this could be considered as an inconsistency, they could have used the 
descriptions behind the scores to establish the coloured bands. What is more, asymmetrical 
risk matrices can be deliberately designed due to a hospital’s risk appetite. A hospital might 
not be willing to take the risk with a consequence score of 5 and a likelihood score of 1 
whereas the same hospital might be willing to take the risk with a consequence score of 1 and 
a likelihood score of 5. However, no information was provided on the reviewed documents to 
explaining how the coloured bands are established. 
Additionally, findings showed that two risk matrices (M3 and M6, see Figure 2) share an 
edge between green and red cells, which increases the possibility of categorising a low risk to 
a high-risk level. This was criticised by Cox as this increases the risk of incorrectly 
categorising a risk rating, and it was recommended that there be an intermediate band 
between green and red. However, Cox also warned that having two or more intermediate 
bands could also lead to incorrectly categorising risks due to the increased possibility of weak 
consistency, and 76 of the reviewed risk matrices have at least two intermediate bands, as can 
be seen in Figure 3.(9) The limitations inherent in risk matrix design, therefore, increase the 
risk of misprioritisation. 
4.3. Further Considerations Regarding the Use of Risk Matrices 
There are some inherent limitations in the use of risk matrices, which also apply to the risk 
matrices currently used in hospitals. These limitations include the simplicity of the 
consideration of risk rating, the difficulty of linking relevant risks and the subjectivity of risk 
scoring. 
The findings reveal that hospitals replace risk ratings by risk scores, and hospitals 
recommend estimating the risk score by simply considering likelihood and consequence 
scores. However, this simplification has recently been criticised and it has been 
recommended that additional factors are considered.(23,39,40) These factors include the 
determination of the risk sources, uncertainty about the events and their consequences, and 
the strength of knowledge of the assessors.(41–43) For example, there might be two situations 
giving the same place in the risk matrix, but they are completely different from a risk 
perspective (in one case really poor knowledge supporting the likelihoods, in the other very 
strong). The strength of knowledge of assessors can be evaluated by considering data used for 
the assessment, the justification for the likelihood assumptions made, and reaching agreement 
between the assessors regarding the assessment.(23) Although these factors might add more 
complexity to current practice in healthcare, risk would better be described by consequence, 
likelihood of event with that consequence and strength of knowledge supporting the 
likelihood and consequence judgment. In so doing, Aven and Renn suggested the use of an 
extended risk matrix that specifies the strength of knowledge used in the risk assumptions by 
dividing it as strong, medium and poor.(28) 
A risk matrix can only assess an individual risk at any one time,(9,19) which limits the 
understanding of the risk sources as well as the links between different risks. Many of the 
risks immediately evident are linked to other less visible risks. For instance, a risk to inpatient 
bed capacity may be linked to delays on surgery, and delays in discharge. However, other 
tools and techniques can also be used with risk matrices to address some of this challenge. 
Failure modes and effects analysis may help to identify undesired events in relation to the 
system to be assessed, and the bow-tie technique may help in understanding the pathways of 
a risk from its sources to consequences.(14) However, with the exception of Chatzimichailidou 
et al,(44) there is little evidence to show that such tools, especially the bow-tie, are often used 
in hospitals.(40–42) More importantly, these tools also assess a single event or failure mode at 
once.  
Subjectivity also impacts the effectiveness of risk matrices. Individual perception might lead 
to biased judgements about the management of the risks.(18,21) This may stem from job 
function or seniority, personal experiences and the level of confidence.(21,48,49) Furthermore, 
individuals might purposefully be subjective. Risks can be deliberately understated or 
overstated in order to avoid or gain management attention. For instance, a study revealed that 
the patient risk of metal phosphide poisoning was overstated by hospital staff due to the 
ethical and legal issues involved.(50) Suggestions to overcome these problems include the use 
of quantitative data, team assessment, peer review, risk scoring guidance and a separate risk 
matrix for each consequence domain (e.g. financial and harm related consequences).(10,13,51) 
Since data in healthcare might not be easily quantified, providing better guidance on scoring 
risks and encouraging staff to use this guidance may be helpful to overcome bias in decisions. 
However, anecdotal evidence so far shows that healthcare staff might score risks without 
consideration of the descriptors behind the scores. As a result, different individuals might 
score the same risk differently even in the same hospital.  
In summary, risk matrices are widely used to assess risks in hospitals. However, there are a 
number of limitations to using risk matrices that might lead to poor prioritisation of risks and 
inadequate resource allocation. Nonetheless, there are still some advantages to using the risk 
matrix as a tool in assessing risks. A risk matrix helps illustrate risk scores in a table and 
prioritise risks through the use of coloured cells, and there may be no need for expertise to 
use this tool.(9,52) These features make the risk matrices the commonly used tool to assess 
risks in hospitals.   
Limitations 
The main limitation of this research is that the reviewed risk assessment policies and 
procedures may not reflect the actual practice of risk assessment and subsequent actions. For 
example, risk managers and risk leads might use risk matrices differently to add more value 
to their risk assessment. However, until recently, the National Health Service Litigation 
Authority (NHS LA) was assessing the risk management practices of acute hospitals by 
considering the NHS LA risk management standards, which includes the assessment of 
hospitals’ risk management strategies, policies and procedures in terms of its content, practice 
and performance.(53) We, therefore, believe that such documents should reflect the actual 
practice. 
Furthermore, the non-response rate (37 percent) to the FOI request is likely to have affected 
this study. However, it is likely that a higher response rate would have led us to collect a 
higher number of risk matrix types as well as different levels of guidance without 
significantly affecting the arguments we make here. 
What is more, we must note that we could not own all the knowledge of the risk science in 
our implications. This was due to hospitals unpreparedness to the dramatic changes in their 
risk management practice. As a result, it is likely that our suggestions might still misguide 
decision makers to some extent, but would provide better guidance for the use of risk 
matrices. 
5. CONCLUSION 
A variety of risk matrices are used across acute hospitals in the English National Health 
Service and are accompanied by the provision of different levels of guidance by different 
hospitals. Reviews of the risk assessment policies and procedures reveal that there is 
insufficient guidance available for the use of risk matrices. Indeed, no matter how well 
guidance has been provided by hospitals, there are limitations inherent to the use of risk 
matrices. So, until the time that hospitals are open and prepared to the dramatic changes on 
the way to use or not to use the risk matrices, we have a number of suggestions for 
consideration in English acute hospitals: 
− Consider risk by not only estimating the likelihood of an event with its potential 
consequence, but also the strength of knowledge supporting the likelihood and 
consequence judgment. Perhaps, three dimensional risk matrices can be designed for 
this purpose. 
− Introduce guidance on what to do when a risk has several consequences in multiple 
domains (e.g. a single risk may lead to personal injury, economic loss or reputational 
damage).  
− Clarify which likelihood scoring scheme (i.e. nominal, time-framed and probability) 
should be used and in which circumstances. 
− Clarify how risk should be scored where a range of consequence could occur with 
different likelihoods (e.g. a risk of patient fall could lead to no harm, minor cuts and 
hip fracture with different likelihoods). 
− Clarify how risks that have been scored the same should be prioritised. 
− Remind risk assessors that a risk matrix is not a tool for them to make decisions 
directly; but rather is one of several methods designed to support their decisions. 
− Remind risk assessors that risk prioritisation require additional factors to be 
determined such as organisational objectives, detectability legislation, and the 
resources needed to implement any risk controls. 
− Remind risk assessors that risk scores might show little relation to the real risk rating, 
and, therefore, a balanced and unbiased professional and subjective judgement should 
be involved when making risk informed decisions. 
This study aims to raise more discussions on the use of risk matrices in risk management in 
hospitals, and it contributes to the current risk assessment practice in hospitals by 
highlighting the main challenges of the use of risk matrices as well as the guidance provided 
for their use. Further research is needed to strengthen the evidence behind the practical use of 
risk matrices in terms of how risks are actually scored and what the actual role of played by 
risk matrices is in making risk-based decisions.  
Acknowledgement 
The authors are grateful to the two reviewers for their insignificant contribution to the 
original version of this paper. This work was funded by the National Institute for Health 
Research (NIHR) Collaboration for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care 
(CLAHRC) East of England, at Cambridgeshire and Peterborough National Health Service 
Foundation Trust. The support is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those of 
the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NHS, the NIHR or the Department of Health 




1.  Vincent C, Amalberti R. Safer healthcare: strategies for the real world. 2016:1–157. 
2.  DoH. An Organisation with a Memory. London: Department of Health, 2000. 
3.  IOM. To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Healthcare System. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, 
Donaldson MS (eds). Institute of Medicine, 1999. 
4.  Eidesen K, Sollid SJM, Aven T. Risk assessment in critical care medicine: a tool to 
assess patient safety. Journal of Risk Research, 2009; 12(3–4):281–294. 
5.  The Health Foundation. Using Safety Cases in Industry and Healthcare. London, 2012. 
6.  BSI. BS ISO 31000: Risk Management: Principles and Guidelines. London: British 
Standards Institution, 2009. 
7.  NPSA. Healthcare Risk Assessment Made Easy. London: National Patient Safety 
Agency, 2007. 
8.  Gadd SA, Keeley DM, Balmforth HF. Pitfalls in risk assessment: examples from the 
UK. Safety Science, 2004; 42:841–857. 
9.  Cox LA. What’s wrong with risk matrices? Risk Analysis, 2008; 28(2):497–512. 
10.  Card A, Ward J, Clarkson P. Trust-level risk evaluation and risk control guidance in 
the NHS East of England. Risk Analysis, 2014; 34(8):1469–1481. 
11.  HM Treasury. The Orange Book: Management of Risk- Principles and Concepts. 
London: HM Treasury, 2004. 
12.  NPSA. A Risk Matrix for Risk Managers. London: National Patient Safety Agency, 
2008. 
13.  Duijm NJ. Recommendations on the use and design of risk matrices. Safety Science, 
2015; 76:21–31. 
14.  BSI. BS EN 31010: Risk Management: Risk Assessment Techniques. London: British 
Standards Institution, 2010. 
15.  Macdonald D. Hazops, Trips and Alarms. Mackay S (ed). Oxford: Newnes, 2004. 
16.  Arnetz J, Hamblin L, Ager J, Aranyos D, Upfal M, Luborsky M, Russell J, 
Essenmacher L. Application and implementation of the hazard risk matrix to identify 
hospital workplaces at risk for violence. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, 
2014; 57:1276–1284. 
17.  Ale B, Burnap P, Slater D. On the origin of PCDS – (probability consequence 
diagrams). Safety Science, 2015; 72:229–239. 
18.  Smith ED, Siefert WT, Drain D. Risk matrix input data biases. Systems Engineering, 
2009; 12(4):344–360. 
19.  Baybutt P. Designing risk matrices to avoid risk ranking reversal error. Process Safety 
Progress, 2015; 35(1):41–46. 
20.  Cox LA, Popken DA. Some limitations of aggregate exposure metrics. Risk Analysis, 
2007; 27(2):439–445. 
21.  Ball DJ, Watt J. Further thoughts on the utility of risk matrices. Risk Analysis, 2013; 
33(11):2068–2078. 
22.  Vatanpour S, Hrudey SE, Dinu I. Can public health risk assessment using risk matrices 
be misleading? International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 
2015; 12(8):9575–88. 
23.  Aven T. Improving risk characterisations in practical situations by highlighting 
knowledge aspects, with applications to risk matrices. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 2017; 167:42–48. 
24.  Aven T. How the integration of System 1- System 2 thinking and recent risk 
perspectives can improve risk assessment and management. Reliability Engineering 
and System Safety, 2018. 
25.  NHS. Acute hospital. National Health Service, 
http://www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/healthcare-setting/acute-hospital/ (accessed on 
19 December, 2017). 
26.  NHS England. How to make a Freedom of Information requrest to NHS England. NHS 
England, https://www.england.nhs.uk/contact-us/foi/ (accessed on 19 December, 
2017). 
27.  HSE. Reducing Risks, Protecting People: HSE’s Decision-Making Process. London: 
Health and Safety Executive, 2001. 
28.  Aven T, Renn O. An evaluation of the treatment of risk and uncertainties in the IPCC 
reports on climate change. Risk Analysis, 2015; 35(4):701–712. 
29.  Flage R, Aven T. Expressing and communicating uncertainty and bias in relation to 
Quantitative Risk Analysis. Pp. 1691–1699 in European Safety and Relibility 
Conference- ESREL. 2014. 
30.  Suddle S. The weighted risk analysis. Safety Science, 2009; 47(5):668–679. 
31.  ORR. Common Safety Method for Risk Evaluation and Assessment. London: Office 
of Rail Regulation, 2015. 
32.  COSO. Risks Assessment in Practice. Curtis P, Carey M (eds). Committee of 
Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission, 2012. 
33.  Pasquini A, Pozzi S, Save L. A critical view of severity classification in risk 
assessment methods. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2011; 96:53–63. 
34.  AFSC. Air Force System Safety Handbook. Kirtland: Air Force Safety Agency, 2000. 
35.  Manuele F. A primer on hazard analysis and risk assessment. Pp. 167–206 in Manuele 
F (ed). Advanced Safety Management: Focusing on Z10 and Serious Injury 
Prevention. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2014. 
36.  Aven T. How some types of risk assessments can support resilience analysis and 
management. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2017; 167:536–543. 
37.  Simsekler M, Kaya G, Ward J, Clarkson P. Evaluating inputs of failure modes and 
effects analysis in identifying patient safety risks. International Journal of Health Care 
Quality Assurance, 2018. 
38.  Cox LA, Babayev D, Huber W. Some limitations of qualitative risk rating systems. 
Risk Analysis, 2005; 25(3):651–662. 
39.  Khorsandi J, Aven T. Incorporating assumption deviation risk in quantitative risk 
assessments: a semi-quantitative approach. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 
2017; 163:22–32. 
40.  Askeland T, Flage R, Aven T. Moving beyond probabilities- strength of knowledge 
characterisations applied to security. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2017; 
159:196–205. 
41.  Aven T. On the new ISO guide on risk management terminology. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 2011; 96:719–726. 
42.  Aven T. The risk concept-historical and recent development trends. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 2012; 99:33–44. 
43.  Aven T, Krohn BS. A new perspective on how to understand, assess and manage risk 
and the unforeseen. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 2014; 121:1–10. 
44.  Chatzimichailidou M, Ward J, Horberry T, Clarkson P. A Comparison of the Bow-Tie 
and STAMP approaches to reduce the risk of surgical instrument retention. Risk 
Analysis, 2017. 
45.  Lago P, Bizzarri G, Scalzotto F, Parpaiola A, Amigoni A, Putoto G, Perilongo G. Use 
of FMEA analysis to reduce risk of errors in prescribing and administering drugs in 
paediatric wards: a quality improvement report. British Medical Journal Open, 2012; 
2:e001249. 
46.  Broggi S, Cantone MC, Chiara A, Di Muzio N, Longobardi B, Mangili P, Veronese I. 
Application of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to pretreatment phases in 
tomotherapy. Journal of Applied Clinical Medical Physics, 2013; 14(5):265–277. 
47.  Wierenga PC, Lie-A-Huen L, de Rooij SE, Klazinga NS, Guchelaar H-J, Smorenburg 
SM. Application of the Bow-Tie model in medication safety risk analysis. Drug 
Safety, 2009; 32(8):663–673. 
48.  Hubbard D, Evans D. Problems with scoring methods and ordinal scales in risk 
assessment. IBM Journal of Research and Development, 2010; 54(3):2–10. 
49.  HSE. Marine Risk Assessment. London: Health and Safety Executive, 2001. 
50.  Nocera A, Levitin HW, Hilton JMN. Dangerous bodies: a case of fatal aluminum 
phosphide poisoning. Medical Journal of Australia, 2000; 176:403. 
51.  Aven T. Foundational issues in risk assessment and risk management. Risk Analysis, 
2012; 32(10):1647–1656. 
52.  Thomas P, Bratvold R, Bickel J. The risk of using risk matrices. Society of Petroleum 
Engineers, 2014; 6(2):56–66. 
53.  NHSLA. NHSLA Risk Management Standards 2013-14. London, 2013. 
 
